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THE ENTENTE OF FREE NATIONS

BY DAVID JAYNE HILL

IN every period of warfare since modern nations came into existence, there have been serious reflections upon the cost and the horrors of war which have culminated in schemes for preventing it altogether. Some of these have been merely abstract theories regarding the manner in which international conflicts could be obviated or rendered impossible; while others have been of a more pragmatic character, aiming to create in the realm of actuality a situation which would safeguard the interests of peace and possibly of justice.

Among the devices of a purely theoretical order, one of the most notable, suggested by the struggle between the House of Hapsburg with the rest of Europe, was the "Great Design" which the Duke of Sully, in 1634, attributed to Henry IV of France, but which it is now clearly established was not conceived by that monarch and appears to have been invented by the fallen minister himself as a means of procuring his own recall to the administration of the affairs of his country. All Europe, according to this plan, was to be organized into fifteen states, which together should constitute one Christian Republic in which wars were to be prevented by a General Council, composed of forty delegates, meeting annually in the most central cities of the different countries in rotation. The Thirty Years' War, which was ended by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 had already elicited Emeric Crucé's *Nouveau Cynée*, written in 1623, in which the Republic of Venice was proposed as a place where a permanent corps of ambassadors should reside and by their votes settle all international affairs. Hugo Grotius, perceiving that such settlements could not be made except upon the basis of previously accepted rules or principles, in 1625 had given the world his *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, the first con-

siderable treatise on the Law of Nations; and to this he had added the proposal of "some kind of body in whose assemblies the quarrels of each one might be terminated by the judgment of others not interested", and that "means be sought to constrain the parties to agree to reasonable conditions." In like manner, the Peace of Utrecht, in 1713, was accompanied by the elaborate *Projet de la Paix Perpétuelle* of the Abbé Saint-Pierre, in which he proposed the formation of a universal alliance of sovereigns to secure them against the misfortunes of war by abolishing the separate use of force, perfecting their laws, and submitting their differences to judicial decision; with a provision that a refractory sovereign who violated a treaty or refused to accept a judgment, should be brought to terms by the others arming against him and charging to his account the expense of the operation. The Napoleonic Wars also brought their contribution of plans for international peace, the most conspicuous effort being that of Immanuel Kant, in 1796, in his essay on "Eternal Peace", in which the solution offered by this Prussian philosopher was that all states should become republican in form; a condition, as he thought, which would enable them by some kind of general federation to unite their forces for the preservation of peace.

It is not surprising, therefore, that, as a result of the defeat of the aggressors in the Great War now, as we hope, happily terminated by the united efforts of a group of advanced and liberal nations, these plans, or modifications of them, should again receive attention, and that a general desire should be created for "some kind of body", as Grotius expressed the aspiration, which could prevent the repetition of the experience through which the world has passed.

What was impossible before the Great War, it is believed by many, could be easily accomplished now; and that, therefore, even before a peace is finally concluded, and as an essential part of it and a condition of its perpetuity, a "League of Nations" should be formed.

There are, it is true, wide differences of opinion regarding the objects, the methods, the organization, and the obligations of such a league, varying from the creation of a World State by the federation of the existing nations into one vast political organism including all, both small and great, to a limited compact confined to a few Powers with no function beyond the peaceable adjudication of differences by an inter-

national tribunal without power to enforce its judgments.

The occasion is, no doubt, opportune for a thorough discussion of these widely differing plans, and it is timely for their advocates to express their views and support their conceptions by argument; but it is by no means to be taken for granted that any one of these projects, however honestly and earnestly its supporters may believe it should be at once adopted, is either practicable or desirable. The stress of insistence should not be placed upon the means of forcing the acceptance of a particular plan, however meritorious it may be in itself, but upon the intelligent comparison of different plans and a patient examination of their probable effects.

It is not the intention here to discuss exhaustively any special plan, much less to propose one, but to direct attention to the course of procedure most likely to secure the ends which are in the minds of all who entertain convictions upon this subject.

That which needs, first of all, to be emphasized is, that no one Power can expect, or should desire, to impose upon others a system which they do not all heartily approve; and, in the next place, that if any plan is to be permanent and effective, it must have the support not only of the leading governments but of the great masses of the people whom those governments represent. It is, therefore, greatly to be desired that the public should be fully informed before any decisive step is taken, that nothing should be urged until it is well understood, and that no theorist, however competent and trusted, should be regarded as a trustee of a whole people in a matter of such import and consequence. The true principle that should be invoked for guidance in this matter was well and forcibly enunciated by the President of the United States when, in 1912, in his first electoral campaign, he dwelt upon the value of "common counsel", and, as one of the people, seeking leadership, expressed his attitude regarding public policies in the words: "I am one of those who absolutely reject the trustee theory, the guardianship theory. I have never found a man who knew how to take care of me, and, reasoning from that point out, I conjecture that there isn't any man who knows how to take care of all the people of the United States. I suspect that the people of the United States understand their own interests better than any group of men in the confines of the country understand them."

It may, of course, be thought that it is not the "interests

of the people of the United States " that should prevail in the formation of an organization so general as a " League of Nations ", but the interests of humanity. This may be true, but the " trustee theory, the guardianship theory ", is perhaps even less applicable to humanity as a whole than it is to a single people, who in ordinary circumstances may at least have an opportunity to choose, and to some extent direct, their trustee or guardian.

It would, however, be a fatal error to overlook the fact that the interests of the people of the United States, as well as the interests of other portions of humanity, are deeply involved in any plan to form a " League of Nations ". Great benefits might accrue, or serious disadvantages might result from occupying a place in it. It is the duty of the people as well as the statesmen of the nations that may enter into such a league, to consider for themselves the alleged benefits and the possible disadvantages; and this, speaking generally, they will, no doubt, do. It will be done in Great Britain, in France, in Italy, and in Japan,—to mention only a few of the co-belligerents,—and their interests, which will be different, will be carefully considered. The signs of this are evident to those who are familiar with the contemporary comments of the European press upon this subject, especially the great British quarterlies, which have already discussed the " League of Nations " with a candor, a seriousness, and an understanding that have not been equalled by American periodicals of the same class, which have inclined to take the complimentary speeches of Lloyd George, Lord Grey, Mr. Asquith, and Mr. Balfour as a complete and authoritative expression of British opinion, but this is far from being the case.

No discussion of the subject has been published in America to compare in amplitude of knowledge and solidity of judgment with the treatment of it under the title " The Greatest League of Nations ", by Lord Sydenham of Combe, in the August number of *The Nineteenth Century and After*, which concludes: " We shall not win the war by planning Leagues of Peace to meet circumstances which we cannot yet foresee. Like the paper constitutions of Sieyès they may prove impracticable; but the Holy Alliance against the forces of evil remains, and when it is crowned with victory it can be turned into a powerful agency for maintaining the peace of the world. Then, in some happier future, the vision of Isaiah may be fulfilled, and ' Nation shall not lift up sword

against nation; neither shall they learn war any more'."

Nor has anything appeared in the American periodicals so searching and so well informed as the article by J. B. Firth, under the title "The Government and the League of Nations", in *The Fortnightly Review* for September. He points out that the British Government some months ago appointed "a very well chosen Committee",—as Mr. Balfour described it,—“on which international law and history were powerfully represented”, to examine and report on a "League of Nations". "The report has been drawn up, but its contents have not been divulged. Neither Lord Curzon nor Mr. Balfour alluded to it; they did not even say that it had been considered by the War Cabinet. By a curious coincidence the same official reticence is being observed in France. There, too, an authoritative Commission, presided over by M. Bourgeois, was appointed by the Government, and issued its report last January; but it has not been published in France, and, according to Lord Curzon, no copy of it had reached the British Government on June 26th. Why this secretiveness, both in London and Paris? If there had been practical unanimity in favor of the project there could be no reason for reserve."

There is, no doubt, however, an excellent reason for this discreet silence. It is the desire of the officials of both England and France not to wound the sensibilities of the Americans, who are credited with being the sponsors of the "League of Nations". The British leaders, always without definition, but in a fine spirit of courtesy, have taken up the watchword, a "League of Nations",—for it is so far nothing more,—and Lord Curzon has been able to say in the House of Lords, that opinion in England in favor of the League was "rather in advance of the opinion of any of our Allies save the United States"; and he added, that "if the British Government went ahead too quickly, or too abruptly, there was danger of a rebuff." As a confirmation of this danger, Mr. Firth remarks, that, "although the report of the French Commission has not been published, it is an open secret that its judgment was adverse to any proposal for establishing an international force which shall be always ready to enforce the decisions of the League upon a recalcitrant member."

In an admirable historic summary, Mr. Firth illustrates with instances the tedious wrangling in the so-called Concert

of Europe over the simplest and most necessary forms of co-operative action, and asks: "How can these idealists talk airily about the establishment of an international army or the dispatch of an international expedition to deal with an aggressor against the 'League of Nations', when they see how long it has taken Japan and the United States to come to an understanding on the subject of joint action in Siberia? Every hour was of priceless value . . . Yet days and weeks were suffered to slip by for political reasons which are perfectly well known and thoroughly understood. Will it be any different when there is a 'League of Nations'?"

A passage as instructive to Americans as it is characteristic of English thought is found in the October number of *The English Review*, in which its editor, Austin Harrison, illustrates what he conceives to be a general principle by what he regards as a conspicuous example. "There is and can be no such thing", he says, "as democratic government, as loosely understood; for every democracy is controlled by an oligarchy, whether of intellect, of interest, or of mere popularity, and the purer the democracy the greater would seem to be the authority of its oligarchy, as we have all seen in the astonishing singleness, discipline, and elasticity of the heterogeneous masses of America at war under what is nothing less than the sovereign will of the President. It is this acceptance of oligarchical authority in America that differentiates the democracy of the New World from that of the Old, as particularly exemplified in Britain. Take the case of conscription, which in America became law overnight, though three thousand miles of sea divided America from the théâtre of the war, and in no case was any motive put forward for war but that of principle. Here it took us two years, because our democracy does not accept its oligarchy, does not recognize acquiescence, is intellectually and traditionally antagonized by the very idea of authority, whether of government or opportunity."

It is true that the people of the United States have been singularly united and singularly obedient to leadership, but the comment fails to find a true interpretation of the fact. This nation has never bowed to "the sovereign will of the President". It has respected the voice of individual conscience. It beheld in the conduct of Germany an inexpressible wrong of gigantic proportions. It shuddered, but it did not hesitate to judge or condemn. Millions, tens of mil-

lions, of men in America wanted to fight Germany when the will of the President was not yet for war, and chafed under the neutrality of their Government. Thousands of our young men went to Canada and to France, in order to help in defeating Germany before any "sovereign will" had expressed itself in the United States. Here was a peaceful nation that did not want peace, but victory; a nation that would have accused and cursed itself if it had not been allowed to fight. The "oligarchy", if there be one, responded to the "sovereign will" of an aroused people, not to the leadership of a President. It adhered to him in war, not because he commanded it, but because it had commanded him. There is the explanation of conscription. It was, indeed, based on a "principle"; but the principle was not a governmental enunciation, it was a deep-seated and almost universal declaration of the national mind.

It took England, Mr. Harrison says, "two years to adopt conscription, because English democracy does not accept its oligarchy". In the result the advantage is with England. It took us much more than two years to prepare for war, because our oligarchy did not appeal to its democracy.

The error of this brilliant writer regarding our "oligarchy" and its influence has led him more seriously astray on some other points. Without our intervention, he thinks, the Great War would have had to be settled on the principle of "the balance of power",—a peace without a victory; and from this he argues that "the message of America is democracy, her mission is union". America is thus held responsible for proposing a "League of Nations". We have been fighting, he thinks, "not Germany; not, in the historical sense, the Germans; but the German idea of mastery, the German feudal system, the Kultur of imperial and dynastic ambition. America is thus fighting against the attitude of the balance of power".

This is a total misapprehension, which proves how inadequately British perception has comprehended our real motives as a people, and how insufficiently we have thus far expressed them. It assumes that we have been fighting for "fourteen points" of European and world reconstruction; and that the success of those, including a "League of Nations", was what we have had in mind. There is probably not one soldier or even one officer in the American Army, either in the field or at home, who ever thought for a moment

that he, or his country, was carrying on this war "against the attitude of the balance of power", or to establish a "League of Nations". Not one in a hundred thousand ever dreamed that the war had anything to do with "the balance of power"; and few would have known what it meant if it were suggested to them. They were fighting *the Germans*, because the Germans were brutalizing mankind, violating international law, and destroying people's homes. And there is not a man of them who would not fight again for the same reason.

We do not wish to be misunderstood in Europe by the representation that we went into this war with the purpose, or for the end, of creating a "League of Nations." We have not, as a people, studied the project. We do not all even know what it is. There are many full-fledged and very ingenious schemes for a "League of Nations" which palpably contradict one another, and no "oligarchy" has yet informed us which one it prefers. Of one thing some of us are sure, we do not wish, or intend, to be bound in the dark, or to be controlled by abstract terms that would make us shrink from keeping our obligations in a concrete way; and we know that nothing is more illusive than the requirements of a treaty, unless it is very precise and treats of matters clearly and definitely known. We, as a people, went into this war to prevent Germany from throttling the world, as she had done to Belgium, and Serbia, and whoever else opposed or did not aid her. It was not to secure for her a place of equality in a society whose laws and whose material interests she had deliberately planned to destroy, that two million peaceful American citizens put on their uniforms and went to Europe over seas in whose waters torpedoes lurked and mines floated. It was to render this savagery forever impossible.

We have not, however, to read far before we discover that it is not a league in the sense of a mere legal compact, with minutely specified obligations, that Mr. Austin Harrison has in mind. "The real problem in a League of Nations is, to my mind", he says, "not the sanction—that the soldiers will see to on their return—not the machinery, not the tribunal, not the immediate dispensation of justice, but the creation of a regularized co-operation capable of the necessary flexibility and progressiveness, which alone can give it the life of durability." In brief, it is not a treaty signed by diplomats, but a union of consciences in a common cause of justice

that is to save the world. Of this no American soldier, I think, would need to be convinced. It was a consciousness of this in his own understanding that made him accept gladly his marching orders.

In another article in the same Review, Austin Harrison, to illustrate his meaning, cites the words of the President of the United States uttered on September 27th, 1918: "It is the peculiarity of this great war that, while statesmen have seemed to cast about for definitions of their purpose and have sometimes seemed to shift their ground and point of view, the thought of the mass of men, whom statesmen are supposed to instruct and lead, has grown more and more unclouded, more and more certain of what it is they are fighting for. National purposes have fallen more and more into the background, and the common purpose of enlightened mankind has taken their place. The counsels of plain men have become on all hands more simple and straightforward and more unified than the counsels of sophisticated men of affairs, who still retain the impression that they are playing a game of power and playing for high stakes. That is why I have said that this is a people's war, not a statesman's. Statesmen must follow the clarified common thought or be broken."

These are words as true as they are nobly spoken. They have given to the man who uttered them an unprecedented prestige. In words equally true and noble, Mr. Harrison expresses the expectations which they inspire. "In place of diplomacy acting in secrecy for purely selfish or national motives, Europe is bidden to regard the opportunity of the whole, bidden to the law of a commonwealth." This is assumed to be the message of America that is to save Europe.

Unfortunately, this message is enveloped in a nebula shot through with seeming contradictions. "It is not", Mr. Harrison continues, "a question of juridical form and formula. Its sanction must be inborn, induced—the evolution of harmony. Peace can never be established on a durable basis through the organization of international councils of control; by police machinery; still less by penal or constrictive impositions. That is the old—the Napoleonic, the German—way. . . . All must go to the table of peace ready to give and to give up; to found a charter of international rights based not on force, but on the sanction of free peoples."

This might well be the message of America. It sounds well, and may be true; though perhaps rather puzzling to the

members of the League to Enforce Peace. But what is the authority for it? Who has been charged to deliver America's message? Who has formulated it? Who has explained it?

In glowing words, Mr. Harrison reiterates the thought that Europe is to be somehow saved by America. "Either an attempt to restart Europe on some accepted law or morality of co-operative utility instead of competitive force with the object of removing the causes of war, or we shall achieve nothing permanent", he declares. And it is America that is to give the start. And he tells us in what manner. "I can only repeat," he says, "what I have urged again and again, that national conferences should be convened, charged to offer their concerted advice upon the problems of the subject peoples; that these conferences should consider concurrently a common agenda; that the proceedings of all these conferences should be made public, and that they should be in daily telegraphic communication with one another. Something of the kind has been done in France, but here (in England) we have heard of no such assembly of intellect. A Declaration of Rights can hardly issue from a bureaucracy; it must come from the clash of the best minds of democracy, thinking aloud. . . . For the problems are not only international, they are also national, and the danger to the constitution of the new fabric of laws will be found in their application. That is why the collective wisdom emanating from these National Conferences would seem the indispensable condition of the success of any permanent international law. . . . Now the antecedent condition to such a Law of Nations must be a Declaration of Rights."

What progress have we, the American people, made in this direction? We are assumed to have felt,—we are said even to have imparted to Europe,—the impulse toward a better international adjustment; but what channel for its expression, what mechanism for its effective operation, has been deliberately even discussed either by or before the people? "The voice of the people must make itself felt, directing the voice of the Conference", we are told; "for only so can there be any 'demonstration' of the new thought essential to release, or any manifestation of sacrifice." What an opportunity then has been missed, to say openly what sacrifices are expected of us? What obligations are to be incurred by us? What legal forms are to be accepted by us, in the great process of creating an international government

which, in important matters, will supersede our own? for that is what is implied in a "League of Nations".

I shall not attempt to enter here upon any analysis of the various ingenious drafts of an international constitution, as the fundamental law regulating the legislative, judicial, and executive powers of such an international government,—a government which, within its sphere, will control the governments of the nations that subscribe to it. One thing, however, is plain, that to possess any efficiency these powers must detract in important ways and in large degree from the powers of the National Governments and involve a considerable sacrifice of their sovereignty. It is true, on the one hand, that sovereignty in what are called the "democracies" has been gradually transferred from a personal absolute monarch to the people, or to some portion of them; and it is also true, on the other hand, that the conception of sovereignty in constitutional States has been to some degree modified by the recognized limitation of the irresponsible use of force and the addition of ethical elements in its exercise. In brief, no people can rightly claim to possess rights in proportion to their power, and sovereignty cannot, in a juristic sense, be longer regarded as strictly absolute. In every state founded upon the rights of persons, which is the basis claimed by democracy, the rights of the whole people cannot exceed what is necessary to the maintenance of the right of each.

In proportion as they become republican, as Kant contends, States may find it easier to combine in federations than was the case with absolute monarchies; still, even republics are jealous of their sovereign powers, and they are not disposed lightly to surrender them. Every scheme for a League of Nations requires this surrender in some degree, for every such league creates in some form a supernational body of control, to which the members agree to submit. Membership in such a league, of necessity, implies the renunciation of any independent foreign policy.

In a world composed of nations varying in culture, character, education, and honor, as well as in numbers, strength, and military traditions, such a renunciation cannot wisely be made without unusual assurances, and it cannot be universal. If made at all, it must be made for the sake of advantages not otherwise attainable, and for an association that is beyond suspicion. A league which had for its object to enforce peace, without specific foreknowledge of the occasions that

might call for its exercise of the war-making power, could not be wisely created except between nations of the highest moral responsibility and mutual confidence, and could never safely be allowed to include any nation that could not be trusted to accept and obey the decisions of a tribunal to which it might consent to submit a difference.

A league professing to be composed only of "free nations" would rest upon a basis of an extremely ambiguous character. What nations are to be classed as "free"? Certainly no nation that holds in subjection any people not permitted to enjoy self-government. And the mutability of nations must not be overlooked. The expression "free nations" is especially equivocal in a period of revolution and transition, like the present. Neither Russia, nor Austria-Hungary, nor even Germany could claim a place in it, nor could the fragments into which they may possibly fall before the movements of revolt or secession are completed. And what is to be said of the suppressed nationalities which are aspiring to independence but have not yet attained it?

Is it not a little singular that the course of events and the effort to control them by general principles should have led men to claim that the coming peace should include such logical antinomies as a partial renunciation of national sovereignty and the complete attainment of self-determination?

The origin of the problem is more evident than its solution. On the one hand, some nations are regarded as too independent, too powerful, and too aspiring, to be considered safe for the rest of the world, unless they are willing to have imposed upon them certain restraints which equality seems to require; while, on the other, some nations are too much oppressed, too feeble, and too submissive, to assert the national rights which even-handed justice would assign to them.

We are here confronted with the indisputable fact of the natural inequality of nations, and this disparity extends to every circumstance of national life, except one. Juristically, all independent and responsible States, whether large or small, have equal abstract rights to existence, self-preservation, self-defense, and self-determination; but culturally, economically, and potentially, they are, and must remain, unequal. If they enter a "League of Nations", they must enter it upon terms which the strong are disposed to grant to the weak and which the weak are obliged to accept from the

strong. It is evident who will make the laws. But if self-determination is a right, and its realization is possible only through the exercise of force, who shall say that a suppressed nation may not plan and achieve its own development, as the greater States have done? Shall the great empires impose upon the world an unchangeable status of their own devising; or shall the Balkan States, for example, agree upon their own boundaries and affiliations?

The problem of adjustment is further complicated by the fact that the modern nation is no longer a merely juristic entity, having for its only object the maintenance of order and justice among its own inhabitants. It has become an economic entity, a business corporation, looking for markets for its commodities and for raw material from which to manufacture them. The State owns mines, railways, steamships, colonies, and uses them as means of increasing its own power of control over the products and the markets of the world. Will it open its house to the passer-by, invite him to its banquet-board, and share with him its accumulated treasures?

This is a question which time will answer. And a very short time has sufficed for a partial response. Every one of the Powers is now planning how it may increase its trade, and how it may extend its control over natural resources.

In so far as the object of a "League of Nations" is to prevent this rivalry from becoming dangerously acute, its purpose is no doubt commendable; but the danger it involves is, that, in striving to enforce a legal compulsion, it may be felt to be oppressive,—a new type of multiplex imperialism in place of the old. In one respect, at least, this danger is imminent. If a "League of Nations" proves to be a device to compel independent nations to make economic sacrifices for the benefit of others, and establishes a central control of resources which becomes a dispenser of benefits which the beneficiaries have not aided in creating, then the League will prove a bondage that will be resented, and will not be endured. It is very appealing to our better natures to inform us, that the future is to be "a life of service", in which we must perform a generous part. If this is voluntary, the call may well be a spur to action. But if the "League of Nations" aims to obtain these sacrifices, not by such voluntary action as the associated nations have freely offered to one another during the period of war, by supplies of food, loans of money, free medical service, and gifts of a magnitude which

the world has never before known, but by the enforced operation of a legal contract, the call is different. In one scheme at least, the world's supplies, the world's credit, and the world's military strength, in the name of equal economic opportunity together with the "freedom of the seas," whatever that may mean, are to be placed under the control of a central authority,—an International Ministry or Council of Delegates, whose decisions shall be paramount and final in the great questions of trade and war.

England cannot surrender her defense of the sea, nor France be forced into economic community with a convicted burglar, nor America obliged to open her ports on conditions imposed by a supernational control predominantly composed of foreign representatives.

If nations had not developed into business corporations, and had confined their activities to the realm of protecting the rights of their individual citizens, a "League of Nations" might have meant something quite different from this. Laws of a universal character might have been readily assented to for the uniform protection of individual persons which it is now difficult for sovereign Powers to accept as applying to themselves. This is particularly true when international restraints are directed against perfect freedom in national fiscal policy. No nation whose citizens are required by their habits and climate to maintain a high standard of living, or suffer deterioration by lowering it, can afford to bind itself to grant equal terms to imports, especially manufactured articles, from all countries alike. They would soon find their working classes reduced to starvation wages accompanied by the total paralysis of many lines of industry as a consequence of an enforced competition with lower races, living in climates and under conditions where the customary standard of life can be maintained at a trifling cost, while foreign employers were reaping rich harvests of profit by exploiting practically subject peoples.

Under such a régime, the people of the United States would suffer more than any others, for the reason that their standard of living is the highest in the world. It is on this account that by voluntary sacrifice the United States has been able to rescue from starvation and to supply with needed commodities the impoverished nations of the world. This has been one of their chief contributions to the Great Understanding, the Entente of Free Nations, in saving from ruin the

countries overridden by centralized economic power. It has been possible because personal initiative and enterprise, protected and left free to achieve its own development without absorption by the State, had accumulated forces and agencies which, being free, were in reality the most efficient in the world. Without that freedom and without that protection, the contribution of America in the war would have been impossible. Our country would have been in a state of colonial dependence upon the great manufacturing centers of the European nations.

Our interest and our policy are, therefore, plain: first of all, to hold fast to our freedom; and, next, to prevent from falling into desuetude that unwritten charter of union which constitutes the Entente of Free Nations, cherishing its unity of purpose as the most precious of human achievements. It is a moral, not a legal unity, that has given us the victory. Uncovenanted armies have gathered from every quarter of the globe to assert the determination of the free nations that the rule of arbitrary force shall be ended. Our sons and brothers have been among them. Together they have faced death and have shed their blood, and men of many nations sleep in common graves. It is the most splendid assurance for the peace of the world and the rule of justice that can be imagined. The sense of comradeship in a holy cause cannot perish. A new Brotherhood of Men has come into being. Let us not mar its simplicity by distrust or controversy, or try to force upon any of our co-belligerents any untried theory of legal union which might be honestly rejected, or accepted with doubt and reluctance. The battle has been fought in the name of freedom. Let us remain free in the hour of victory.

But in our freedom there are certain principles which must not and will not be forgotten. They will control the practice of the Entente of Free Nations, which must continue with its present provisions for conference, discussion, and united action. A marked step of advancement has been taken in the recognition of the principle that all international engagements and undertakings must be justified by the moral law and must have publicity. A formal covenant in this sense may be found possible, and it may take a solemn legal form; but, whether this be the case or not, the war has established a few precepts that will, undoubtedly, be admitted to a permanent place in the code of international right. No

treaty between nations should be considered binding unless it is published when it is made. No negotiations affecting the destinies of peoples should be conducted without their knowledge of the fact and of the obligations to which they are to be committed. No war should be begun without a public statement of the reasons for it and an opportunity for public mediation between the disputants, which should never be considered an offense. No territory occupied in war should be claimed by right of conquest without a public hearing of all who are affected by it.

The attempt to state these, or any, definite principles, illustrates how inadequate a strictly documentary form of engagement of necessity must be. It is, however, the spirit, not the form, that must be depended upon for the security which a formal treaty of alliance or an understanding can afford. The whole structure of international peace and justice rests upon the character of the peoples who form the Society of Nations. The Great War has subjected the combatants to a fiery test. It cannot well be doubted that the Entente of Free Nations will stand also the test of peace. A solidarity that has been only strengthened by the dangers of battle will certainly not be broken in the attempt to revise the Law of Nations, to make it the basis of clearer understandings, and to increase the confidence with which the co-partners in victory will bring before the judgment bar of reason the differences that may tend to divide them. But the perfection of this understanding is a matter of growth and of gradual adjustment. What cannot be accomplished by a stroke of the pen at a given moment of time may prove an easy task if the spirit of the Entente, and especially the sense of freedom which brought it into being, can be retained and matured. But this can be done only by a renunciation of the desire to force any favorite plan to an issue within the Entente. For a considerable time, unless new dangers are to be incurred, armies and navies will be necessary to guard the peace that is to be signed at Versailles. It will be wise to maintain the supremacy of the forces that will have made it possible. For this the responsibility rests upon all, according to their strength. And because they are strong they may, by the constancy, justice, and unselfishness of their conduct, prove to all mankind that really free nations alone can preserve the peace of the world.

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